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Paths – On the Formation of the Subject in a 
Theory of Semiotics
The deep subject of any concrete semiotic critical practice is its very contradictory format. 
(A Theory of Semiotics, 1976: 317).
That semiotics has close relations with semantics, the latter having a logical-phil-
osophical or rather linguistic origin, is a fact that is not only theoretically but 
also historically established. On one side, generative semiotics moves from struc-
tural semantics, so that the entire work by Greimas could be read as an expansion 
of his first work, his Sémantique structurale (Greimas 1966) properly indicating 
the opening of his research program (Fabbri 2000). On the other side, as a con- 
sequence of his philosophical milieu, Eco is not encumbered by the burden of lin-
guistics: yet it is always in the light of the linguistic-structural semantic paradigm 
that he attempted in his crucial book, A Theory of Semiotics, that generalization 
of semiotics announced in the Italian translation (Trattato di semiotica generale, 
literally, Treatise on general semiotics). The thesis that I will try to develop in my 
contribution is that Eco’s reflection on semantics in his Treatise (that I consider 
his magna opus) implies a specific theory of semiotic subjectivity that will remain 
operative in his later works. Violi (2007) has already investigated some issues 
related to subjectivity in Eco’s Encyclopaedia. Here I will try to describe analyti-
cally how this specific subjectivity emerges in A Theory of Semiotics.
Models
How does this generalization, from linguistic meaning to meaning per se, occur 
in A Theory of Semiotics? In relation to this point, Eco’s discussion sets up a 
sequence of three “models” of meaning. The word “model” is not accidental, as 
a modelling attitude is indeed crucial in Eco (Basso 2006). It is thus worth inves-
tigating the three models that Eco’s theory of meaning takes into account: the 
“KF model”, the “Revised Model (RM)”, the “model Q” (discussed respectively 
in sections 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12 of A Theory of Semiotics). All the models share two 
features:
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Compositionality: all models simply share “the method of semantic decom-
position” (Violi 1997: 82). Hence the possibility of obtaining an inventory of units, 
that indeed can be subject to very different interpretations.
Graph structure: given a finite set of components (and independently from 
how they are obtained), it is possible to arrange the same set through a graph. The 
latter is a structure that, in its minimal form, consists of a finite set of vertices and 
a finite set of edges (Diestel 2000), seen as relations between the vertices (each 
element of the set of the edges is a pair of vertices) (Figure 1).
(a) V (b) E (c) G
Figure 1: Set V of vertices (a), set E of edges (b), graph G = {V, E}.
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The KF model is the one proposed by Katz and Fodor (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The KF model (ATS: 97)
In relation to graph modeling, the KF model provides:
– concerning vertices, a distinction between syntactic markers, semantic 
markers, distinguishers, selection restrictions;
– concerning edges, these are implicitly directed, which makes the graph 
a “directed” one. This implies that the graph must be traversed one way, 
without the possibility to go back. Edges are not labeled, as they represent 
only sequencing relations;
– concerning the type of the graph, KF is a tree;
– finally, concerning the dynamics of the process, it shall be assumed (as it is 
not explicitly stated) that the cognitive operation involves a dynamic element 
traversing the graph. The result is, in a technical sense, a “path” on the graph, 
i.e., a sequence of vertices.
The cahier de doléance (2.10.1 and 2.10.2) that Eco compiles discussing the KF 
model leads to a complete reformulation of the model, culminating into a critique 
of dictionary-based semantics in favor of the encyclopaedic format (later devel-
oped in AP and SFL).
In Eco’s Revised Model, a graph structure for the “sememe” is proposed 
(Figure 3).
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Figure 3: The RM model (ATS: 105).
In this case:
– concerning vertices, the available items are sign vehicle, syntactic markers, 
semantic markers, contextual selections, selection restrictions. In any case, 
Eco explicitly rejects any metalinguistic status for selections, intended as 
“semantic units just like the others except that they perform a switching 
function” (Eco 1976: 105);
– concerning edges, as in the case of the model KF, it is implicitly assumed that 
the graph is directed;
– yet, with regard to the type of the graph, the examples given in section 2.11 
represent –in all cases– trees, exactly as in the model KF.
Finally, taking into account the dynamics of the process, a certain ambiguity is 
still present. For one thing is the data structure (the sememe represented as a 
graph), another one is the instantiation of a possible path, that is, the definition 
of a procedure.
The last model to be introduced is the model Q (Figure 4), which owes its 
name to a proposal by Quillian for lexical semantic memory: its fundamental 
postulate is an “infinite semantic recursivity” (Eco 1976: 121). Quillian’s Semantic 
memory is the first model ever made of a semantic network and pioneered a wide 
range of other similar models flourished especially in the 70s in Artificial Intel-
ligence (see Brachman and Levesque 1985) and Brachman (1985), studies closer 
to semiotics are Rastier (1991) and Violi (1997)). Since each marker constitutes “a 
sort of embedded sememe”, it follows that from each marker another tree is gen-
erated, “and so on ad infinitum” (Eco 1976: 121). Semantic units become a “mass 
of interconnected nodes” (Eco 1976: 122), so as to form such an “polydimensional 
network” that cannot be represented “in all its complexity” (Eco 1976: 124). If a 
lot is expressly said about the previous models (KF and RM), little is said on the 
other hand, at least explicitly, about the model Q. In the few pages dedicated to its 
discussion, Eco states the ante litteram deleuze-guattarian rhyzomatic theoretical 
nature of the object (the rhyzome being explicitly mentioned by Eco in SFL, see 
Paolucci (2007) and Paolucci (2010)), but he dedicates only half a page to the dis-
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cussion of how the model already works in Quillian, despite evidently the model 
Q is much more interesting for Eco than the KF.
 
Figure 4: The Q model (ATS: 123).
The models and their relations
The linear ordering of the three models suggests a sequence that coincides with 
a progressive refinement of semiotic modelling. The KF only serves as the object 
of the pars destruens, to be demolished in order to build a new one, the RM. This 
progression between the first two models allows to extrapolate an incremental 
value in the model Q with respect to the RM. The model Q is the spearhead of a 
progressive conversion of semantics into semiotics.
An interesting feature of the model sequence is that only the RM is formu-
lated by Eco, the first and third models being borrowed from other authors. If 
the KF is the subject of a careful philological analysis that prepares its complete 
dismissing, the model Q is accepted in toto: as a consequence, its description is 
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bare-bones, almost in an ostensive form, by reproducing the graphic example 
provided by Quillian.
This asymmetry is demonstrated by the short life of model Q in Eco’s theory. 
In the timespan between A Theory of Semiotics and LF, Eco moves his interests 
from semantic networks to frames, and he integrates these hypotheses with other 
proposals always coming from Artificial Intelligence (e.g., scripts): this shift of 
interest, from “weak” to “strong slot-and-filler structures” (Rich and Knight 1991), 
is documented in LF and SFL. Such an evolution of the structures of representa-
tion for intentional semantics has been accompanied by the constant use of the 
RM, for example in textual and in metaphorological studies (respectively, in LF 
and SFL). Some aspects are particularly relevant in the model Q in relation to 
Eco’s discussion:
1. the model has a precise formal structure;
2. it takes into account (the vertices of the graph) semantic units, i.e., cultural 
items: their origin is lexical (like in Greimas, one would say);
3. it does not include hierarchies except as local phenomena;
4. the structure of the graph is no more a tree, considered inadequate, but a 
cyclic graph (Quillian 1985: 107);
5. everything takes place within it, since the units of linguistic origin are inter-
defined. To quote Quillian:
There are no word concepts as such that are “primitive”. Everything is simply 
defined in terms of some ordered configuration of other things in the memory 
(Quillian 1985: 103).
There is indeed a characteristic “flatness” of such a network: a “uniformity” 
that was the main object of criticism to the model Q within Artificial Intelligence 
(Brachman 1985: 199): but such a criticism addresses exactly what is the main 
strength of the model Q both for Quillian and Eco.
And so, why not use the model Q? The latter has already been operative when 
Eco discusses it, having been effectively implemented on a computer in 1966 as a 
part of Quillian’s doctoral thesis. The answer is at the end obvious: Eco explicitly 
states that “the model [Q], in all its complexity, is based on a process of unlim-
ited semiosis” (Eco 1976: 122). The model Q is thus considered by Eco as a para-
digmatic representation of the Global Encyclopaedia and of its main feature, its 
being “virtual, theoretical, hypothetical” (Violi 1992: 102). As a consequence, the 
model which is methodologically at work in later texts (LF, SFL) is the RM, while 
the model Q is invoked as regulative, epistemological hypothesis.
Thus, the modelling sequence in A Theory of Semiotics is actually a structure 
that, after the KF, bifurcates as a function of a contextual selection: if the contex-
tual selection is “semiotics”, then the RM is at play; if the contextual selection is 
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“philosophy”, then the model Q is the relevant one. Such a bifurcation introduces 
a dualism that Eco will resume in its subsequent reflections. The RM is intended 
as a modelling application, while the Q model is assumed as a philosophical 
foundation that cannot have commerce with empirical elements, as it constitutes 
an epistemological limit.
Encyclopaedia and the traces of its subjects
It has been noted that in the Encyclopaedia “there is a theory, basically very 
precise, of the subject” (Violi 1992: 101). Pushing the observation further, it can 
be said that the pure model of semiosis coincides exactly with a theory of the 
pure semiotic subject. This asymptotic theory of the subject, a theory that must 
remain liminal, is developed in few pages of A Theory of Semiotics: the discus-
sion of the epistemological limits (section 0.9), the presentation of the model Q 
(section 2.12), the ending considerations on the subject of enunciation (section 4, 
see Violi 2007).
Starting back from the model Q as a philosophical model, the Encyclopaedia 
as a regulative ideal takes the form of a very dense graph, its vertices consisting 
of cultural units and its edges representing possible, uniform connections, that 
is, pure chaining relations. The Encyclopaedia is a “knowledge representation” 
even more decidedly “uniform” (Brachman 1985) of Quillian’s semantic memory, 
a “Flatland” (Paolucci 2007) (Paolucci, 2010) that requires a “surface theory” 
(Volli 1992: 82). What is guaranteed by the topological lattice of the Encyclopae-
dia is simply the possibility of a pure circulation: there are passages that connect 
places.
Now, what is made available by the Encyclopaedia is a repository of traces, 
according to what is essential in determining the semiotic sense: sense is always 
the a posteriori result of a process of reconstruction from its “externalization”: 
“the man and the external sign are identical”, Eco reminds by citing Peirce. The 
activity of this circulating subject should be traced, in the double sense of pro-
ducing a sign and keeping it in memory.
“The subject […] is presupposed by the statements” and “it has to be ‘read’ 
as an element of the conveyed content” (Eco 1976: 315). Eco’s theory of modes of 
sign production outlines a semiotic historicity in the form of a set of productive 
operations (Valle 2007, 2016). In its phenomenology, the labor of recognition plays 
a central role. Thus, the task is to recognize (in the technical sense of the theory 
of sign production) the activity of the semiotic subject, starting from the traces 
that it has left.
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The first determination of the subject is then expressed as a circulation on the 
Encyclopaedia. Here the subject is a tracing operator that circulates on the ency-
clopaedic graph (the “tracing process” of Quillian (1985: 101)). The most appro-
priate model for this subject is a myopic automaton that gropes abductively along 
the edges of the graph (Fabbri 1992: 179). Nothing more is said of the circulation 
process, but it can be assumed that such a subject acts like a finite-state machine 
(typically modelled through graphs), in which, given a vertex (a state), the prob-
abilities to reach the next vertex (i.e., the transition to the next state through a 
certain edge) is independent from the probabilities that lead to the starting vertex. 
This would be a memoryless, so-called “Markovian”, machine, a shortsighted 
automaton that moves from state to state, incapable of seeing behind him.
The pure operational nature of this automaton is however not directly 
describable. Rather, it is reconstructed through recognition (in Eco’s technical 
sense) from the traces that it has left: from the “debris carried over from previ-
ous semiosis” (SFL: 45, see Violi (2007)), which alone constitutes the memory 
of its operations. As the subject of circulation/production is reconstructed from 
its traces, this subject coincides with a portion of the Encyclopaedia. Or more 
clearly, referring to the model Q, with a path on the graph of the Encyclopaedia: 
the subject is conveyed content, the one who has walked the path that has been 
recognised.
But, who recognizes the automaton subject? Rather than one, two subjects 
are thus given, or better, produced by semiosis. The model Q represents the way 
in which the semiosis is produced in its pure state, as a boundary condition 
unattainable per se, a condition of unrepresentability. Instead, coupled with the 
subject circulating on the encyclopaedic graph (the automaton), a second subject 
is given, who recognizes it by tracing its path. But to represent the Encyclopaedia 
is to look at it from outside, thus reintroducing a “panoramic subject”. Put in 
these terms, the theoretical framework would be still tainted by a certain exter-
nalism. There would be two subjects, and the reconstruction of a dualism that 
cannot be tolerated in Eco’s encyclopaedic Monism. In A Theory of Semiotics the 
issue of the subject is also discussed in the section on “Epistemological limit”, in 
which an “indeterminacy principle” is proposed. The formulation of this princi-
ple adds a further characterisation to subjectivity. Interpretation – that is, semi-
osis – is, at any level, a production, for the very reason that in principle there 
is no higher level of interpretation: because of this principle, any interpretation 
(including an “epistemological” one) necessarily modifies the landscape that it 
crosses. For this reason, semiotics as an interpretative practice is not like “explor-
ing the sea”, “where the ship’s wake disappears as soon as it has passed”, rather 
it is “like exploring a forest”: such an exploration imposes paths that become 
parts of the landscape (Eco 1976: 29). The Encyclopaedia is thus unrepresentable 
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simply because every representation is a production (SFL: 109, Violi (1997: 241)). 
Keeping track of a trace is to produce a trace, to trace another sign. Nor could it 
be otherwise, as recognition is a mode of production. Therefore the subject that 
recognizes the subject of a production is in turn a subject of production that intro-
duces “ecological variations” in the encyclopaedic landscape (Eco 1976: 29). The 
model Q, with its “mille plateaux” topology, thus represents the “geographical” 
dimension of a “theory of surface”: a graphism to be intended as a set of surfaces 
on which the encyclopaedic graph is placed, the sheet of existence mentioned in 
Peirce’s essay on existential graphs. In the frame of this paradoxical determina-
tion of the Encyclopaedia as a multiple set of flatlands, the second subject, that of 
recognition, is then a subject-cartographer who incessantly charts a map, literally 
a “geography”, by collecting the traces (the paths) that it recognizes.
Thus, the semiotic subject, as defined in A Theory of Semiotics, is both single 
and double. Eco himself warns that it is the “systematic and processual” double 
of semiosis (Eco 1976: 316). The philosophical modelization discussed so far is 
sketched in Figure 5, where a path – generated by the automaton (a) – is observed 
by a cartographer (b), whose labor of recognition at the end results in a new path 
on the graph (c). More precisely:
1. The subject does not coincide with the graph structure of the Encyclopaedia 
but with a principle of circulation on the structure: with the procedure (pos-
tulated but not specified by A Theory of Semiotics) required to traverse the 
graph. This automaton is the subject of sign production as a connection of 
semantic units in the continuum expression/content, the one that for Quil-
lian derives new knowledge through an incessant “plane hopping” (Quillian 
1985: 113).
2. But the circulation of this subject can be accessed only through the traces that 
it leaves, that are to be retrieved by a cartographer-subject. The latter, from its 
position of observation, keeps track of this activity by patiently updating the 
circulation map: it systematizes the process by drawing the plane on which 
the recognized paths lie.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: The automaton subject: process (a); the cartographer subject (solid circle): position 
and definition of the plan that has traced the path (finished, it is a systematic: in solid lines) 
(b); conversion of the cartographer into an automaton (new process, (c)).
3. However, the interpretation by the cartographer is in turn a sign production: 
that is, it is in itself a definition of a path on the encyclopaedic graph. Start-
ing from the traces of the automaton, the cartographer reconstructs the path 
backwards, from end to beginning. This second subject then works exactly in 
the same way of the automaton: it circulates on the graph, in turn producing 
paths that change the structure itself of the graph. Thus, the cartographer 
can be retrieved as an automaton if seen by another cartographer: in fact, 
“semiosis explains itself by itself” (Eco 1976: 71).
4. Therefore, according to this double dynamics of the subject, “formation is 
the only content of the Encyclopaedia”, as noted in a Pareysonian mood by 
Fabbri (1992: 185). A duplicity of the subject, but also a possible doubleness, 
that may create the effect of a panoramic view, the “ideological fallacy” – as 
Eco warns – of a cartographer who pretends to detect “objectively” the opera-
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tions of an automaton, instead producing again the “subjectivity” of another 
path on the graph.1
Hence the duplicity and doubleness of the Encyclopaedia: the oxymoron of an 
oral book that is written while being read, and read while being written.
The Subject: a conclusion
The subject, the hidden opposite of the structure, is thus everywhere in A Theory 
of Semiotics, but in a specific configuration.
– The vitalistic subject-as-a-sign is produced continuously, in the manner pre-
scribed in the second part of A Theory of Semiotics, the theory of sign produc-
tion. The subject is alive and implicit in the myopic teleology of the inferen-
tial automaton.
– The subject is dead, or rather buried. Discussing the “figures of memory”, 
Jacques Fontanille proposes a typology that includes, among the others, the 
“burial” and the “exhumation”, figures “where the place, time and actor 
would be forgotten” (Fontanille 2004: 314). This isotopy of disinterment is 
indeed relevant. In fact, the forward teleology of the automaton is always 
coupled with a backward archeology of the trace.
1 In section 3.2.4 (but only in the Italian edition) Eco discusses the dynamics of semiotic struc-
tures by referring to System Theory and Second-order Cybernetics (TSG: 217, note 3), two theoret-
ical approaches the includes the observation of the system inside the system itself.
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